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WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY IN WAR.
It has often happened that a belligerent in war has been
forced to notice, and define the character of, some new invention
which bears upon hostilities. Thus the list of contraband has
grown during war beyond the limitations of treaty. Thus the
balloon in warfare has been attacked. Thus new and deadly
explosives have been denounced. But naturally the belligerent
will regard a new engine or weapon or device, which is to work
him harm, with a certain prejudice, and his view of its legality
will be colored accordingly. It is the outsider who can preserve
the judicial attitude, not the combatant, in the heat of battle.
It may happen therefore that the opinion of the belligerent
must be revised in calmer mood, as when the Hague Code
declared balloonists not to be spies, in opposition to Bismark's
threat to treat them as such during the siege of Paris.
In a similar way we may be sure the Russians' threat to
treat as spies those private individuals who make use of the
wireless for purposes of war correspondence, will be objected
to, for the one thing certain is that such persons are not spies,
and if not, they should not be treated as such. Perhaps the
new Hague Conference to which Mr. Roosevelt is asking the
powers, will take up this question of the status of the wireless
in war. Meanwhile, we can at least briefly study the points
which will need decision--perhaps find some guiding principle.
Wireless telegraphy in the present war in the East, so far as
appears, has been used in two ways which are of questionable
legality-to maintain intercourse between beleaguered Port
Arthur and Russia, and to send war news to a London paper
rapidly, and independent of military control, by the paper's own
steamer rigged for the purpose. As for the use of wireless
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methods by the belligerents to maintain their own connections
or intercept one another's messages, of course there is no ques-
tion whatever. It is &nly when the neutral is involved that
difficulty arises.
Take the first of these. Apparently by erecting a mast at
Chefoo, on the neutral soil of China, news has passed from Port
Arthur pretty regularly, and has been transmitted by telegraph
thence to Russia. Is the toleration of this practice by China
an unneutral act?
Precedent or analogy and reason are the lights to guide us in
such an inquiry as this. Now the closest analogy is to be found
in the international status, during war, of the world's sub-
marine cable system. This, in great part, is equally out of a
belligerent's reach; too deep in the sea to be grappled, it
equally binds belligerent and neutral together. There is an
international agreement concerning submarine cables, but this
provides only for their protection in normal times. Article XV
reads: "It is understood that the stipulations of this Conven-
tion shall in no wise affect the liberty of action of belligerents."
What liberty of action does the belligerent claim? Here the
only question in dispute relates to the right to cut a neutral-
owned cable running between hostile and neutral points.
beyond the three-mile limit of the neutral state. But this does
not bear upon the problem of the wireless, for the new method
has no tangible apparatus except at the terminal points, which
are by our supposition, the one hostile, the other neutral. As
for the cable end in neutral waters or landed on neutral soil, it
is absolutely beyond the reach of the belligerent. Though not
subject to force, is it not subject to be sealed on demand of a
belligerent on the ground of neutral obligation? In other words,
is the neutral state bound to prevent one belligerent from using
freely for all purposes a cable landed within the former's juris-
diction and which the other belligerent is unable to interrupt.
There seems to be a disposition to impose this burden upon
the neutral. Yet to do so is surely at variance with the entire
theory of neutral obligation hitherto recognized. To barry
hostile dispatches, to serve as a belligerent transport, for
instance, are unneutral services on the part of the neutral indi-
vidual, punished by confiscation of the vehicle of offense. But
it is the belligerent, not the neutral, by existing usage, who
bears the onus of prevention. The neutral is bound to prevent
the use of his territory as a base of operations, to forbid
the fitting out of enemy ships of war in his ports, but not to
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restrain enemy's dispatches, or diplomatic agents or financial
agents, all having it may be a very direct influence upon the
conduct of the war. The distinction is between direct military
preparation on neutral soil, like an armed expedition, and mili-
tary news or orders, a difference as wide as the poles. More-
over, if the neutral is held bound to prevent a belligerent's
use of a submarin6 cable between the two-already in estab-
lished use-or to allow it only under censorship, is he not
equally bound to limit the belligerent's use of a land telegraph
line establishing similar communication, and would not neutral
censorship of belligerent mails be a duty also? If the estab-
lished and safe principle be abandoned, that neutral commerce
and communications are to be as little interfered with as the
needs of war allow, with a presumption in favor of greater rather
than less exemption, are we not launched on a path of neutral
obligation which speedily and necessarily leads us to an absurd
and impossible standard.
Suppose a cable to have joined Spain and Great Britain
during our Spanish War, or China and Great Britain during the
war between China and Japan; would the sealing or censorship
of that cable by Great Britain in either case have been a neutral
duty? I cannot believe it such. The prime object for which
such cable was laid was a commercial one. War comes, and
the same cable may have a military value. But this is an incident
only. It is one of those cases where the interests of neutral
trade are paramount to belligerent considerations, at least until
we have a series of clear precedents to the contrary. The only
approach to such a precedent is the action of Brazil in our
Spanish War. Article V of Brazil's Proclamation of Neutrality,
according to Professor Wilson,* forbids "citizens or aliens
residing in Brazil to announce by telegraph the departure or
near arrival of ship, merchant or war, of the belligerents, or to
give to them any orders, instructions or writings with the pur-
pose of prejudicing the enemy." This did not forbid Spain, for
example, to order an agent in Brazil to prepare coals and prov-
isions for the Spanish fleet. It was a very limited form of such
neutrality enforcemept as we have been discussing. It may be
explicable by some peculiar circumstance. Yet, as it stands
and so far as it goes, it certainly runs counter to the principle
towards which I have leaned. By analogy with that principle,
it would seem that wireless telegraphy, set up on neutral soil,
*Submarine Telegraph Cables in Their International Relations, i9o,, p. 34.
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even if used to maintain intercourse between portions of the
belligerent territory vid the neutral, is beyond the reach of war,
and in no way a violation of neutrality.
But here comes in a qualifying consideration. Suppose the
cable not to have been in ordinary commercial use before the
war, but to have been laid or sought to be laid during war, by
one of the belligerents, as an aid to the prosecution thereof.
Would this be permitted, or is the sufferance of it to be ccnsid-
ered an unneutral act? It was during our war with Spain that
this question actually arose. Professor Lawrence, in his little
book,"War and Neutrality in the Far East," page 219, describes
the incident:
"During the war between America and Spain in x898, the
British authorities refused a request from the United States for
permission to land at Hong Kong a cable which the American
authorities proposed to lay from Manila, then in their military
occupation, and to use for the purposes of their operations
against Spanish territory. The refusal was based upon the
ground that to grant such facilities would be a breach of neutral-
ity. The Government of Washington acquiesced in the decision,
which was given on the advice of the law officers of the Crown,
and was followed by their own Attorney General in 1899."
Only writers of very recent date have discussed this ques-
tion. I can cite only two. Hannis Taylor, in his International
Law, page 754, published in 19o, classifies., under unlawful
neutral service, the "transmission of signals or messages for a
belligerent" between two portions of a fleet, and adds, "The
same principle extends to signaling or bearing of messages
between a land force and a fleet, or to the laying of a cable to
be used chiefly or exclusively for hostile purposes."
Again, Professor G. G. Wilson, in a course of lectures before
the Naval War College at Newport in 19o, upon submarine
cables in their international relations, touches upon the
incident already cited from the pages of Professor Lawrence,
and justifies the action of Great Britain:
"During these negotiations with the company, the United
States had been engaged in the attempt to obtain the consent of
the British Government to land at Hong Kong a United States
cable from Manila. The British authorities gave courteous
consideration to this request. Lord Salisbury replied: 'I have
consulted the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney and SolicitQr
General in respect to your Excellency's communication, and
regret to inform you that I am advised Her Majesty's Govern-
ment is not at liberty to comply with the proposal of the
Government of the United States."
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Hence the author concludes, "That a neutral government
cannot grant a landing place in the time of war to a cable of
either of the belligerents without danger of violation of neu-
trality."
In this opinion, I think we may heartily concur. The dis-
tinction between making use of means of communication
already existing, and establishing new ones during war and for
war purposes, is the same in kind as the distinction between
the use of the regular mails and hiring a dispatch boat. A case
can hardly be imagined where the privilege would be valuable
to both belligerents alike. Being within neutral jurisdiction, the
other belligerent has no power of prevention. No commercial
interests are affected. To suffer it, is an unneutral act or service.
If this conclusion is sound, does it not furnish a perfectly
fair analogy in determining the status of the wireless at Chefoo?
If set up and in commercial use before the war, it would be
very hard to stop its use-as being an unneutral service-after
Port Arthur was beleagured. But it was not so set up. On
the contrary, the wireless connection was devised as the only
available means of enabling Port Arthur to communicate with
St. Petersburg. By it news was sent out and orders returned.
It had especial military value, and no other value. Professor
Lawrence states that the wireless service was abolished by
China in August, but this, I am informed, is an error. Russia
nearly to the end was able to impose her will, in this as
in some other particulars, upon the Chinese authorities.
Nevertheless, in the light of reason and by the force of analogy,
China should have forbidden this use of her soil to the belliger-
ents from the first. By permitting it, she has committed a
breach of neutrality to the detriment of Japan.
The other inquiry proposed is of a different kind. It relates
not to "unneutral service," but to belligerent control of neutral
communications. The London Times had equipped a press
boat to gather and forward military news in cipher. To
shorten its runs from the Corean to the Chinese coast, wireless
communication was set up at Wei-Hai-Wei and messages so
received were forwarded by telegraph. At first no objection
seems to have been made, although the ship was visited by
cruisers of both belligerents. In April, 1904, however, came a
Russian circular to the neutral powers, to the following pur-
port: that all correspondents found to be communicating news
to the enemy within the zone of Russian naval operations, by
means of improved apparatus not provided for in existing con-
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ventions, would thenceforth be considered and treated as spies
and their vessels confiscated. The Russian zone of operations
was speedily narrowed so that this threat could not be enforced,
but the circular should have our consideration. The natural
comment upon it is, that although wireless correspondents may
properly be restricted, at least they are not spies, and to pen-
alize them as such would be official murder. They are not
spies because they lack at least two of the three characteristics
of the spy-they use no disguise or other false pretense, and
they do not gather news with intent to communicate to one of
the belligerents. Nor, properly speaking, do they penetrate
the enemy's lines in search of news. At worst, they perform
the duty of a dispatch boat and might deserve confiscation
therefor. And this only when gathering news with intent to
convey it from one belligerent locality to another, enabling
scattered portions of his fleet, for instance, to keep up their
communications.
The Hague Code to govern land warfare, Section II, Article
29, has this pertinent rule:
"The following are not considered spies; soldiers or civilians
carrying out their mission openly, charged with the delivery of
dispatches destined either for their own army or for that of the
enemy. To this class belong, likewise, individuals sent in bal-
loons to deliver dispatches and generally to maintain communica-
tion between the various parts of an army or a territory."
The Russian threat was futile, but presently the Japanese
Government also tried to restrain the wireless correspondent,
though in gentler fashion. The London Times of May x6th
contains a wireless-cable dispatch from its agent on the
Haimun, stating that the Japanese military authorities, through
the British minister at Tokio, had requested him not to operate
north of a line drawn from Chemulpo to Chefoo until further
notice. Thus confined to waters some eighty miles south of
Port Arthuk, the correspondent protested vigorously, but with-
out result, save the indefinite promise that the limitation would
be removed when military exigencies permitted.
As the poor correspondent cabled: "The position was diffi-
cult in the extreme. I was threatened with capital punishment
by one belligerent, and warned off the high seas and neutral
waters by the other." He disclaimed giving advance news bf
military movements, used cipher and asserted his discretion.
For some time he seems to have kept out of the forbidden
waters, but on May 26th he wired important news as to Japanese
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landings north of Port Arthur, from the neighborhood of Niu-
Chwang and June 3 d was off Kiau Chau Bay to pick up the
latest information from the attack upon Nanshan hill. A few
days later, without explanation in the Times, the service was
discontinued. Judging from appearances only and without posi-
tive knowledge, it would seem that, in his thirst for news, their
correspondent had sought prohibited waters and in consequence
his license had been withdrawn by the Japanese.
Here was no blind, brutal threat to hang a newspaper cor-
respondent using the wireless, but a claim to restrict his field of
operations. Thus, as with his brethren on land, if allowed, it
must be under such stringent conditions, as humanly speaking,
to prevent his gathering news at first hand altogether.
One remark should be made here: No correspondent, how.
ever discreet, can tell what items of the news which he forwards
may affect the operations of war. If the news sent is a mere
repetition of what has been received from other sources, it will
not warrant the cost; if new, it will speedily filter back in a
dozen ways to the other belligerent. And many correspondents
are not discreet. The glory of one coup would far outweight
all other considerations. So that control on sea as well as on
land is reasonable and customary. Our only question here, as
it seems to me, should be as to the nature of this control. It
might be prohibition; it might be censorship; it might be
restriction as to locality; it might be a license system. But
that control of some sort is proper, I believe is beyond question.
Suppose aerial navigation to be so perfected as to make it
physically possible for correspondents to hover over the forces
of belligerents, observe their every movement, retire to neutral
soil and send their information to a neutral journal. The fact
that news thus gathered was impartially given to the world, or
that the balloonists were discreet could hardly weigh against
the prohibition of the practice.
And such news-gathering could be prohibited doubtless, for
if the correspondent could use aerial locomotion, so could the
belligerents.
Is the wandering correspondent, in his own steamer, roving
free along belligerent shores, hovering about belligerent fleets,
combining the war correspondent and the dispatch bearer, with
the new wireless at his disposal to hasten his dispatches, in a
position essentially unlike that just imagined? The Times'
agent on the Haimun admits that he once caught on his
apparatus a wireless message from one war ship to another, but
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without understanding it. Such capacity is clearly dangerous.
If we are right ,in thinking that control of the wireless cor-
respondent is proper and necessary, as of the submarine cable
from an enemy's coast, or as of a neutral correspondent with
one's own forces, it must be control of a nature adapted to the
kind of communication employed. Take censorship, for
instance. To be complete, it would require the joint residence
on board ship of an officer of each belligerent, with a several
right of veto. For if the censorship were not joint, the interest
of one party only would be looked out for, while forbidden
news or false news of the other would be probable. That is,
the wireless, under a single censor, would presently drift into
unneutral service. That joint censorship on board could not be
a feasible status, or conducive to news-gathering or satisfactory
to journal or belligerents must be apparent to everyone.
Nor would a license system promise better. For one cannot
conceive of a correspondent so approving himself to both bellig-
erents as to hold a license from both; but if he is licensed by
but one he will be held inevitably to take on that one's char.
acter.
A restriction as to the locality within which the wireless
system of gathering news might operate must also be mutually
agreed on by the belligerents, to be of value, unless control of
the sea lies absolutely in the hands of one of them. In any
case, if respected, this restriction would make it impossible to
get anything of value. While if not respected-and could flesh
and blood withstand the temptation-there comes about friction,
coercion, the need of constant surveillance, leakage of dangerous
information.
By process of exclusion, we reason, therefore, that news-
gathering by sea, with the aid of the wireless, is of such a
nature as to be inadmissible in warfare, and to require entire
prohibition under penalty of confiscation. It is a service bear-
ing an analogy to the dispatch boat, the submarine cable and
the war correspondent, in peculiar combination. The dispatch
boat is guilty of unneutral service in behalf of one combatant
and can be confiscated by the other; the submarine cable can
be cut or worked at the belligerent end under censorship; the
war correspondent, by universal usage, is only allowed to
accompany an army subject to strict regulations. The wireless
news.gatherer, combining the dangerous qualities of all three,
should not be permitted at all.
T. S. Woolsey.
